800 River Road Operating Co LL v. NLRB by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-29-2015 
800 River Road Operating Co LL v. NLRB 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"800 River Road Operating Co LL v. NLRB" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 426. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/426 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 14-1571 and 14-2036 
_____________ 
 
 
800 RIVER ROAD OPERATING CO LLC,  
DBA Woodcrest Health Care Center, 
                                                   Petitioner in No. 14-1571 
 
v. 
 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
                                                  Respondent 
 
 
1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST 
NEW JERSEY REGION, 
         Intervenor 
 
      *Amended Pursuant to Clerk  
      Order entered 04/22/14 
 
 
  
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
      Cross-Petitioner in No. 14-2036 
 
v. 
 
800 RIVER ROAD OPERATING CO LLC,  
D/B/A Woodcrest Health Care Center, 
      Cross-Respondent  
 
    
 
On Petition for Review and Cross-Application  
for Enforcement of an Order of  
the National Labor Relations Board 
(Case No. 22-CA-083628) 
     
 
Argued on January 23, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 29, 2015) 
 
 
Paul D. Clement, Esq. 
William R. Levi, Esq. 
Erin Murphy, Esq.  (Argued) 
Bancroft PLLC 
1919 M Street, N.W. 
Suite 470 
Washington, DC 20036 
3 
 
 
Rosemary Alito, Esq. 
George P. Barbatsuly, Esq. 
K & L Gates, LLP 
One Newark Center 
Tenth Floor 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 Counsel for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent 800 
River Road Operating Co, LLC 
 
 
Kira D. Vol, Esq. 
Julie B. Broido, Esq. 
Jared D. Cantor, Esq.   (Argued) 
Linda Dreeben, Esq. 
Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Esq. 
Jennifer Abruzzo, Esq. 
John H. Ferguson, Esq. 
National Labor Relations Board 
Appellate Court Branch 
1099 14th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20570 
  Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner  
  National Labor Relations Board  
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
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Petitioner 800 River Road Operating Co. LLC, d/b/a 
Woodcrest Health Care Center (“Woodcrest”), seeks review 
of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) 
decision and order (“Order”), which found that Woodcrest 
violated § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (“NLRA” or “Act”), by ommitting 
various unfair labor practices.  Woodcrest Health Care Ctr., 
360 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (Feb. 27, 2014).  The NLRB cross-
petitions for enforcement of the Order.  The charging party in 
the underlying Board proceeding, 1199 SEIU United 
Healthcare Workers East New Jersey Region (“Union”), 
intervened in this appeal in support of the Order.   
 
In January 2012, the Union petitioned for an election 
to unionize some of Woodcrest’s employees.  The election 
was held in early March 2012.  The Union charged that 
certain conduct of Woodcrest before and after the election 
constituted unfair labor practices.  This conduct included: (1) 
withholding of election-eligible employees’ benefits, (2) 
coercively interrogating employees, and (3) creating an 
unlawful impression of surveillance.  Woodcrest lost before 
the Board and now appeals the Board’s rulings.  We will 
vacate in part, affirm and enforce in part, and remand for 
further consideration in light of this opinion. 
I. Background 
Woodcrest is a limited liability corporation engaged in 
the business of operating a rehabilitation and nursing facility.  
On January 23, 2012, the Union filed a petition for an election 
to determine whether certain employees of Woodcrest would 
unionize.  The election was held on March 9, 2012, and the 
employees voted to unionize.  Woodcrest filed objections to 
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the election, and the Union filed a charge against Woodcrest 
alleging that Woodcrest committed various unfair labor 
practices in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3).  The NLRB 
issued a first amended complaint against Woodcrest, and the 
case was tried before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
in Newark, New Jersey. 
 
The ALJ found that Woodcrest committed unfair labor 
practices by withholding benefits from election-eligible 
employees and by engaging in three coercive interrogations 
of election-eligible employees, but that Woodcrest did not 
create an unlawful impression of surveillance in another 
exchange with an employee.  Woodcrest, the NLRB, and the 
Union each filed exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.  On 
appeal, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision with respect to 
the benefit withholding and interrogation claims, but it 
reversed with respect to the surveillance claim.  Thus, the 
Union emerged successful on all of the charges.  Woodcrest 
appeals, and the NLRB cross-appeals for enforcement of the 
Order. 
II. Jurisdiction 
We have jurisdiction over Woodcrest’s petition for 
review pursuant to § 10(f) of the NLRA and over the NLRB’s 
cross-petition for enforcement pursuant to § 10(e).  See 29 
U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f).1   
                                              
1 On appeal, for the first time, Woodcrest asserts that the 
interrogations were protected by the First Amendment.  This 
argument implicates § 8(c) of the NLRA, which incorporates 
First Amendment principles into the statutory scheme.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 158(c) (“The expressing of any views, argument, or 
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III. Standard of Review 
“We afford considerable deference to the Board.”  
Grane Health Care v. NLRB, 712 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 
2013).  The Supreme Court “has emphasized often that the 
NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing and 
applying national labor policy.”  NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 
Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990).  Courts will uphold 
the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA “as long as it is 
                                                                                                     
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, 
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be 
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the 
provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”).  A § 8(c) 
challenge comes too late: it is not properly before us because 
it was not raised before the Board and therefore § 10(e) 
deprives us of jurisdiction over it.  See NLRB v. FES, 301 
F.3d 83, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) 
(“No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its 
member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, 
unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be 
excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”).  First 
Amendment arguments, on the other hand, might not be 
barred, because we have an obligation “to read statutes to 
avoid serious constitutional problems.”  See Sandoval v. 
Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 237 (3d Cir. 1999).  Even assuming we 
may entertain a separate First Amendment argument at this 
point, however, we consider such an argument immaterial to 
our ruling, as the concept of coercive versus permissible 
speech has been the focus of Woodcrest’s argument all along. 
 Viewing this issue through the lens of the First Amendment, 
or § 8(c), would add little or nothing to our ruling. 
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rational and consistent with the Act.”  Id. at 787.  Thus, in 
addressing the benefit withholding issue, we ask whether the 
Board’s rules are rational and consistent with the NRLA.  
 
The Supreme Court has also explained that, “if the 
Board’s application of such a rational rule is supported by 
substantial evidence on the record, courts should enforce the 
Board’s order.”  Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. 
NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).  
“‘Substantial evidence’ has been defined by the Supreme 
Court as simply ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”  
Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1980) (en 
banc) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 
607, 620 (1966)).  We will not “displace the Board’s choice 
between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court 
would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter 
been before it de novo.”  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).  In sum, our standard of review is 
“highly deferential.”  United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union Local 204 v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1078, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  Thus, our question regarding the claims of coercive 
interrogation and unlawful impression of surveillance is 
whether, under this highly deferential standard, substantial 
evidence supports the Board’s conclusions. 
IV. Discussion 
A. Benefit Withholding 
Woodcrest was found to have violated § 8(a)(1) and 
(a)(3) of the NLRA by withholding benefits from employees 
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eligible to vote in the Union election.  Section 8(a)(1) 
establishes that it is “an unfair labor practice for an employer 
. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”  
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  Section 8(a)(3) establishes that it is 
“an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by 
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or 
any term or condition of employment to encourage or 
discourage membership in any labor organization.”  Id. 
§ 158(a)(3).     
1. Background 
The parties stipulated before the ALJ as to the 
evidence relevant to the benefit withholding issue.  
HealthBridge Management, LLC (“HealthBridge”) manages 
Woodcrest, along with three other health care centers.  The 
four health care centers provide a common health insurance 
plan for their employees.  Effective January 1, 2012, that plan 
underwent changes resulting in reduced benefits and 
increased costs for employees.  HealthBridge received 
numerous complaints about these changes and decided to 
adopt certain improvements to the health insurance plan, as 
well as to reduce employee premiums. 
 
Four days before the Union election, on March 5, 
2012, Woodcrest’s administrator directed the distribution of a 
memorandum to all Woodcrest employees, except those 
eligible to vote in the March 9 election.  The memorandum 
announced that improvements would be made to the health 
insurance plan for employees not eligible to vote in the 
upcoming election and that the changes would be retroactive 
to January 1, 2012.   
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Election-eligible employees discovered that their 
coworkers were receiving these improvements, and they 
inquired, shortly after the election, as to their eligibility for 
these benefits.  Woodcrest told the election-eligible 
employees that “we cannot negotiate your contract, your 
benefits, your insurance because right now you are in the 
critical period with the Union” and “we cannot discuss this 
matter at this time.”  (J.A. 384-85.)   
 
The ALJ found that “[t]he evidence establishes 
[Woodcrest] took the action it did, toward certain employees, 
because they were not involved in a representation campaign 
and failed to take action toward other of its employees 
specifically because they were involved in such a campaign.”  
(J.A. 386.)  Because Woodcrest would have granted the 
improvements to the election-eligible employees but for the 
election, the ALJ found that Woodcrest’s conduct violated 
§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the NLRA.  However, the ALJ did not 
make any finding as to Woodcrest’s motivation or its 
justification for its actions.  
The ALJ explained that, “[a]s a general rule, an 
employer, in deciding whether to grant benefits while a 
representation election is pending, should decide that question 
as it would if a union was not in the picture.”  (Id.)  He noted 
that the Board’s jurisprudence had created a safe harbor in 
these situations whereby an employer may “postpone such a 
wage or benefit adjustment so long as it [makes] clear to 
employees that the adjustment would occur whether or not 
they select a union, and that the sole purpose of the 
adjustment’s postponement is to avoid the appearance of 
influencing the election[’s] outcome.”  (Id. (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Retlaw Broad. Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 381, 382 
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(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).)  Woodcrest did 
not follow the course set forth in the safe harbor, which, the 
ALJ reasoned, left “its unit employees with a clear impression 
they were deprived of these system wide benefits because of 
their section 7 rights.”2  (Id.)  In effect, the safe harbor was 
treated as a sword: Woodcrest violated the NLRA because it 
did not comply with the safe harbor. 
The Board, on appeal, “affirm[ed] the [ALJ’s] 
findings, for the reasons set forth in his decision, that 
[Woodcrest] violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by 
announcing and implementing a reduction in healthcare 
premiums and copays for all employees except those who 
were eligible to vote in the representation election.”  (J.A. 
18.)  The Board provided no discussion of its own regarding 
the relevant law.3 
                                              
2 The ALJ’s remedy for this violation was for Woodcrest: (1) 
to cease and desist from “[i]mplementing reductions in 
healthcare premiums and copays that specifically excludes 
employees eligible to vote in the representation election”; (2) 
to affirmatively “[i]mplement the changed healthcare benefits 
for the unit employees effective January 1, 2012, and make 
whole its unit employees for losses they may have suffered as 
a result,” which includes “out-of-pocket losses, if any, 
suffered by any unit employee that had to drop health 
coverage because of the failure of [Woodcrest] to provide the 
new reduced premiums and copays,” and interest; and (3) to 
post a notice that describes Woodcrest’s obligations under the 
NLRA.  (J.A. 387-90.) 
3 The Board’s only modification to the relief awarded by the 
ALJ was to require Woodcrest “to compensate employees for 
the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum 
backpay awards and to file a report with the Social Security 
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2. Analysis 
Section 8(a)(3) makes it “an unfair labor practice for 
an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure 
of employment or any term or condition of employment to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization.”  Id. § 158(a)(3) (emphasis added).  Thus, to 
find a § 8(a)(3) violation, consideration must be given to the 
employer’s motive.  The Supreme Court has held, time and 
again, that a violation of § 8(a)(3) normally turns on an 
employer’s antiunion purpose or motive.  “That Congress 
intended the employer’s purpose in discriminating to be 
controlling is clear.”  Radio Officers’ Union of Commercial 
Telegraphers Union, A.F.L. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 44 (1954) 
(emphasis added); see also Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 
U.S. 300, 311 (1965) (“It has long been established that a 
finding of violation under this section will normally turn on 
the employer’s motivation.”); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 
287 (1965) (“We have determined that the ‘real motive’ of 
the employer in an alleged § 8(a)(3) violation is decisive 
. . . .” (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 
(1937))).  Congress’s intent is clear both in the plain text of 
the statute and in the legislative history.  See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967) (“The 
statutory language ‘discrimination . . . to . . . discourage’ 
means that the finding of a violation normally turns on 
whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an 
antiunion purpose.” (alterations in original) (quoting 29 
                                                                                                     
Administration allocating the backpay awards to the 
appropriate calendar quarters for each employee.”  (J.A. 18 
n.3.) 
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U.S.C. § 158(a)(3))); Radio Officers’ Union, 347 U.S. at 44 
(describing the NLRA’s legislative history).4   
 
However, under certain circumstances, actual proof of 
an improper antiunion motive has been held to be 
unnecessary.  Specifically, “two categories of § 8(a)(3) 
violations . . . do not require proof of motive.”  NLRB v. 
Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223, 1229 (3d Cir. 
1970) (emphasis added).  “First, if an employer’s conduct is 
‘inherently destructive’ of important employee rights, no 
proof of anti-union motivation is needed and the Board can 
find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces 
evidence that his conduct was motivated by business 
considerations.”  Id. at 1227-28.  “Second, if the employer’s 
conduct could have adversely affected employee rights to 
some extent[,] the employer must establish that he was 
motivated by legitimate objectives,” and, if he does not, “the 
conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice ‘without reference 
to intent.’”  Id. at 1228 (quoting NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer 
Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967)).  If the employer does proffer 
a substantial and legitimate business justification for the 
different treatment, however, it can be overcome by proof of 
antiunion motive, notwithstanding an otherwise legitimate 
justification. 
 
                                              
4 An antiunion motivation must be found for a § 8(a)(1) 
violation in the benefits context.  See NLRB v. Hudson 
Transit Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.8 (3d Cir. 1970) 
(“In certain limited factual situations, such as the promise of 
benefits by an employer before a representation election, a 
showing of improper motivation has been required to 
establish a violation of § 8(a)(1).”). 
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In Great Dane, the Supreme Court provided a 
thorough explanation of how the Board should analyze an 
alleged violation of § 8(a)(3).  388 U.S. at 33-34.  As a 
threshold matter, it must make a finding as to whether the 
employer engaged in one of two kinds of “discriminatory 
conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights 
to some extent.”  Id. at 34.  That is, first, if the Board finds the 
employer’s conduct to be “‘inherently destructive’ of 
important employee rights,” then the Board may presume an 
unlawful motive.  Id.  The employer then would have the 
opportunity to demonstrate “counter explanations” for its 
conduct, although the Board “may nevertheless draw an 
inference of improper motive from the conduct itself” and 
find an unfair labor practice, if doing so would “strike the 
proper balance between the asserted business justifications 
and the invasion of employee rights in light of the Act and its 
policy.”  Id. at 33-34.  Second, if the Board finds instead that 
the employer’s conduct fell short of the “inherently 
destructive” category—i.e., “the adverse effect of the 
discriminatory conduct on employee rights is ‘comparatively 
slight’”—then the burden shifts to the employer to “come 
forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business 
justifications for the conduct.”  Id. at 34.  If it does not do so, 
it will be found to have violated § 8(a)(3).  Id.  However, if 
the employer meets this burden, then the burden shifts back to 
the charging party or the NLRB to present “specific 
evidence” of the employer’s intent to discourage Union 
membership.  Id.; see also Brown, 380 U.S. at 287 (describing 
when “specific evidence of intent to discourage union 
membership is necessary to establish a violation of 
§ 8(a)(3)”). 
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We are at a loss as to why the Board’s operative test—
tailored to the safe harbor—failed to address any of these 
issues.  The Board’s failure to make a finding as to the nature 
of the effect on employee rights or the reason for, or purpose 
of, Woodcrest’s different treatment of the election-eligible 
employees cannot be reconciled with what the Supreme Court 
has instructed the ALJ and the Board to do.  Instead, the 
Board treated the § 8(a)(3) (and § 8(a)(1)) inquiry as a “but 
for” test—i.e., asking only whether the employees would 
have received benefits but for the Union’s presence—rather 
than considering the nature of the discrimination or the 
employer’s purpose.  See, e.g., McCormick Longmeadow 
Stone Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1243 (1966) (“[I]n 
withholding the wage increase because of the Union’s failure 
to waive its right to file a charge, the Company deprived them 
of benefits they would have enjoyed but for their resort to 
self-organization.  This . . . violates Section 8(a)(1) . . . and 
hence violates Section 8(a)(3).”); see also Noah’s Bay Area 
Bagels, LLC, 331 N.L.R.B. 188, 203 (2000); Honolulu 
Sporting Goods Co., Ltd., 239 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1295 (1979).  
This test is inconsistent with what the Board was required to 
do, and the record was not developed regarding the issues that 
should have been determinative.5  
                                              
5 We know that Woodcrest separated out the election-eligible 
employees for different treatment because it was election 
time.  However, the Board made no attempt to determine the 
reason Woodcrest decided to award benefits to some 
employees at the time and in the manner that it did.  
Woodcrest’s argument that it did not have an antiunion 
motivation would be exceedingly weak if all it could say was 
that it was following faulty legal advice.  While Woodcrest 
may have felt constrained by the election, its difficulty 
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Given that we are specifically disapproving of the 
reasoning that the Board has repeatedly relied on in finding 
benefit discrimination to violate § 8(a)(3) (and § 8(a)(1)), we 
will remand for the Board to consider these issues in the first 
instance.  See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass’n v. NLRB, 
633 F.2d 1054, 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).  Remand is appropriate 
because we are requiring the Board to modify its longstanding 
mode of analysis in order to comply with the Supreme 
Court’s equally longstanding precedent to the contrary.  See 
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.23 (3d Cir. 
1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Fisher, 
502 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2007). 
B. The Interrogations 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA also prohibits an 
employer from coercively interrogating its employees—that 
is, interrogating them in such a way as to “suggest[] to the 
employees that the employer may take action against them 
because of their pro-Union sympathies.”  Frito-Lay, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 585 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Graham 
Architectural Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534, 537 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (“An employer’s questioning becomes coercive 
and runs afoul of section 8(a)(1) when it ‘suggests to the 
                                                                                                     
navigating the law in and of itself is not a sufficient business 
justification for its conduct.  See St. Francis Fed’n of Nurses 
& Health Prof’ls v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 844, 852 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (“The fact that Hospital management scrupulously 
avoided promising a wage increase until their legal staff gave 
the go-ahead indicates only that they received dubious legal 
advice, not that the announcement was lawful.”).   
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employees that the employer may take action against them 
because of their pro-Union sympathies.’” (quoting Frito-Lay, 
585 F.2d at 65)).  Although “the questioning must reasonably 
have tended to coerce under the circumstances,” it need not 
have “actually had any coercive effect.”  Graham 
Architectural, 637 F.2d at 537-38.  “Whether an employer’s 
actions meet that test is a question of fact for the Board and 
its determinations are conclusive if supported by substantial 
evidence.”  NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 242 
(3d Cir. 1976).  As noted above, “substantial evidence” is a 
“highly deferential” standard of review.  United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, 506 F.3d at 1083. 
 
Here, three interrogations form the basis of the 
coercive interrogation charge.  The participants in these three 
interrogations were: (1) certified nursing assistant Jeffrey 
Jimenez and company attorney James Monica; (2) certified 
nursing assistant Judith Dolcine and Assistant Director of 
Nursing Ansel Vijayan; and (3) licensed practical nurse 
Donna Duggar and supervisor Janet Lewis.  The ALJ found 
that each of these interrogations was coercive.  He explained 
that “[t]he applicable test for determining whether 
questioning an employee constitutes unlawful interrogation is 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test.”  (J.A. 375.)  He used 
the “Bourne factors” to assess the totality of the 
circumstances.  (Id. (citing Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 
(2d Cir. 1964)).)  These factors, which we discuss below, 
include “an examination or consideration of the background 
of the interrogation; the nature of the information sought; the 
identity of the questioner; the place and method of the 
interrogation; and, the truthfulness of any reply.”  (Id.)  
Applying these factors, the ALJ concluded that Woodcrest 
had engaged in coercive interrogations and ordered it to cease 
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and desist from “[i]nterrogating its employees about their 
union membership, activities, and sympathies” and to post a 
notice that Woodcrest “WILL NOT coercively interrogate 
you regarding your union membership, activities, and 
sympathies.”  (J.A. 388, 390.) 
 
On appeal, the Board “agree[d] with the [ALJ], for the 
reasons he states, that [Woodcrest] violated Section 8(a)(1) of 
the Act by coercively interrogating employees both during the 
Union’s campaign to organize employees at [Woodcrest’s] 
rehabilitation and nursing facility and after the Union’s 
certification as the employees’ bargaining representative.”  
(J.A. 18.)   
 
The facts of the three interrogations are set forth 
below. 
1. Jimenez-Monica 
Jimenez was a vocal and visible supporter of the 
Union.  Approximately two weeks after the election, 
Jimenez’s supervisor approached him while he was caring for 
patients.  The supervisor told him that the Director of Nursing 
wanted to see him in her office.  He obliged and went to her 
office, but only Monica was there.  Monica said he was an 
attorney for Woodcrest investigating whether any supervisors 
engaged in objectionable conduct in favor of the Union.  He 
handed Jimenez a form document, which Jimenez signed.  
The form document included the following language: “[t]he 
only purpose I have in interviewing you is to investigate 
whether any objectionable conduct occurred in connection 
with the election held here at Woodcrest on March 9, 2012 
and the events leading to that election during the previous 
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weeks and months”; “[w]e are not interested in determining 
whether you are for or against the Union or if, or how, you 
voted in the election”; and “[w]e positively assure you that 
you have the right to join or not to join any labor organization 
without fear of reprisals.”  (J.A. 377.)  Monica asked Jimenez 
whether any supervisors had been involved with the Union, 
had passed out cards for the Union, or had influenced him in 
any way to change his vote.  He asked if any representative 
for the Union had gone to Jimenez’s house and if Jimenez 
“knew any employees who were involved in a union or 
passing out cards.”  (J.A. 376.)  He also asked Jimenez if he 
had signed a card for the Union.  Jimenez refused to identify 
the employees who had supported the Union.  Jimenez left the 
room but then returned, clearly upset, tore up the signed form 
document, and threw it in the garbage. 
 
Approximately five days later, Jimenez’s supervisor 
approached him, again while he was caring for patients, and 
informed him that Monica wished to see him in a conference 
room.  When Jimenez arrived, Monica told Jimenez that he 
did not believe his answers during their first meeting and 
wanted to give him a second chance to be truthful.  Monica 
repeated many of the same questions, but also asked why 
Jimenez wanted to form a union.  Jimenez answered 
Monica’s questions, and the interrogation ended without 
further incident.   
2. Dolcine-Vijayan 
In the month before the election, Vijayan approached 
Dolcine while she was on duty at her workstation and asked 
to speak with her privately.  Vijayan was “a high-level 
manager.”  (J.A. 375.)  Years prior, Vijayan had hired 
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Dolcine.  During their meeting, Vijayan handed Dolcine a 
“don’t vote union” flyer and asked her if anyone from the 
Union had visited or telephoned her at her home.  She 
answered no but said she supported the Union.  Vijayan asked 
her why she needed the Union, and she responded that she 
needed someone to back her up if something happened or she 
was fired.  Vijayan told her that was not going to happen.   
3. Duggar-Lewis 
Sometime before the election, Lewis, who was “not a 
top-level manager,” attended a management meeting in which 
Woodcrest’s management discussed whether certain 
employees supported the Union.  (J.A. 383.)  An attorney at 
the meeting mentioned that Duggar supported the Union.  
Lewis, who was friends with Duggar, was surprised and so 
decided to ask Duggar if the attorney’s statement were true.  
When asked, Duggar told Lewis that she did not support the 
Union.  The conversation was amicable.  Lewis then reported 
to management that Duggar did not support the Union.  There 
is no evidence that Lewis told Duggar about the management 
meeting or indicated that she would report Duggar’s response.   
4. Analysis 
Given our deferential standard of review as to whether 
substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that 
Woodcrest violated § 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating its 
employees, we will affirm that at least one of these 
interrogations was coercive.  Specifically, substantial 
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Monica-
Jimenez interrogation was coercive.   
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Section 8(a)(1) provides: “It shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
section 157 of this title.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  The Board 
considers the Bourne factors in determining whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the questioning was 
coercive.  See, e.g., Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 
1178 n.20 (1984).  The Bourne factors are:  
 
(1) The background, i.e. is there a history of 
employer hostility and discrimination? 
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g. 
did the interrogator appear to be seeking 
information on which to base taking action 
against individual employees? 
(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e. how high 
was he in the company hierarchy? 
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g. was 
employee called from work to the boss’s office? 
Was there an atmosphere of “unnatural 
formality”? 
(5) Truthfulness of the reply. 
Bourne, 332 F.2d at 48.  The Bourne factors provide a 
framework, albeit not a required checklist, to use when 
assessing a purportedly coercive interrogation.  Rossmore 
House, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1178 n.20; see also United Servs. 
Auto. Ass’n v. NLRB, 387 F.3d 908, 916 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(“Requiring the Board to address each of the Bourne 
factors . . . would transform a flexible tool for organizing 
section 8(a)(1) analysis into a rigid hurdle divorced from its 
purpose of ensuring that non-threatening interrogation is not 
deemed an unfair labor practice.”).  The factors are useful in 
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assisting the adjudicator to consider the totality of the 
circumstances, so we hold that the ALJ’s and the Board’s use 
of the Bourne factors to assess whether a given interrogation 
is coercive is rational and consistent with the NLRA. 
 
Here, notwithstanding that the Board found that three 
employer-employee interactions constituted unlawful 
interrogations, it takes just a single coercive interrogation to 
support the remedy ordered by the Board—namely, a cease 
and desist order and the posting of a notice that Woodcrest 
will not coercively interrogate its employees.  Because the 
Order gives only a single remedy for all three violations, as 
long as at least one of the three interrogations amounted to 
coercion, we will enforce this part of the Order.   
 
The ALJ and the Board’s conclusion that at least one 
of the interrogations violated § 8(a)(1) is supported by 
substantial evidence.  Specifically, we will not disturb the 
conclusion that the Monica-Jimenez interrogation constituted 
a coercive interrogation in violation of § 8(a)(1).  The 
interrogation was initiated by Woodcrest ostensibly to 
determine whether any supervisors had engaged in improper 
conduct.  Jimenez’s supervisor told him that the Director of 
Nursing wanted to see him in her office, but, when Jimenez 
entered the Director’s office, she was not there.  Instead, 
Monica, a lawyer for Woodcrest, was there to conduct an 
exceedingly formal interview.  Monica gave Jimenez a 
written statement that he was asked to sign.  The written 
statement assured Jimenez that “[t]he only purpose I have in 
interviewing you is to investigate whether any objectionable 
conduct occurred in connection with the election held here at 
Woodcrest . . . and the events leading to that election,” and 
that “[w]e are not interested in determining whether you are 
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for or against the Union or if, or how, you voted in the 
election.”  However, the lawyer asked him whether he had 
signed a card for the Union and whether he knew any other 
unit employees (i.e., election-eligible employees, not 
supervisors) who were involved in the Union or passing out 
cards.  (J.A. 377.)  These unwanted questions upset Jimenez 
so much that he returned to the office after leaving the 
meeting and “tore up the document and threw it in the 
garbage.”  (J.A. 376.)  Then, approximately five days later, 
Jimenez’s supervisor again approached Jimenez while he was 
working and told him to meet with the lawyer in a private 
conference room.  The lawyer told him that “he did not 
believe Jimenez’[s] answers during their first exchange and 
wanted to give him a second chance.”  (J.A. 377.)  He asked 
Jimenez why he wanted Woodcrest to unionize and whether 
certain supervisors had campaigned for the Union.   
 
Woodcrest argues that the Monica-Jimenez 
interrogation was found to be coercive solely because Monica 
asked Jimenez why he wanted a union at Woodcrest.  But we 
disagree.  The ALJ and the Board found the interrogation to 
be coercive based on the totality of the circumstances, 
properly applying the Bourne factors.  Woodcrest’s citations 
are off-point.  Woodcrest cites Hughes & Hatcher, Inc. v. 
NLRB for the proposition that “[i]nterrogation of employees 
concerning their membership in the union, membership of 
fellow-employees, or the general activity of the union, absent 
interference or coercion, does not violate the Act.”  393 F.2d 
557, 563 n.4 (6th Cir. 1968).  However, the circumstances 
here were not so benign.  Monica’s questioning of Jimenez 
regarding topics that Monica was purportedly not to inquire 
about, along with the accusation that Jimenez had not told the 
truth, crossed the line.  Cf. NLRB v. Prof’l Tape Co., 422 F.2d 
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989, 990 (7th Cir. 1970) (“This was not a mere inquiry to 
determine Union support.  The continuous questioning of 
Hawkins and Okryesik suggested that the employees were 
being accused of lying about the union activities and in so 
doing, the Company created an atmosphere of antagonism 
toward the Union.”).  Indeed, the ALJ and the Board found 
that the circumstances of Monica’s questioning, taken as a 
whole, “reasonably tend to interfere with the free exercise of 
employee rights under the Act” and were coercive.  (J.A. 
374.)  Given the substantial evidence standard, we are not 
inclined to disturb this conclusion. 
 
Moreover, the Monica-Jimenez interrogation has 
parallels to an interrogation discussed in Graham 
Architectural, which we held was unlawful.  There, the 
interrogation of David Reisinger by Michael Lehr was “not 
part of an ordinary casual conversation; rather, Lehr 
specifically requested Reisinger to come to his office.”  
Graham Architectural, 697 F.2d at 538.  The supervisor also 
“indicated that he had prior knowledge” of the employee’s 
union activities.  Id.  Furthermore, that interrogation involved 
two mitigating factors that are not present here: the 
individuals’ “friendship and the occurrence of the 
conversation in an open plant area.”  Id.  Yet we, 
nevertheless, enforced the Board’s order.  Id. at 543.  Here, 
Jimenez did not know Monica, and the interrogation occurred 
first in Jimenez’s boss’s office and then in a private 
conference room. 
 
The Monica-Jimenez interrogation was also similar to 
a second interrogation found to be unlawful in Graham 
Architectural—the interrogation of Diana Oberdick by her 
supervisor, Robert Reichard—which also involved “not a 
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casual inquiry into a co-worker’s feelings, but a request from 
which a reasonable inference can be drawn that it was aimed 
at securing specific information concerning the genesis of the 
union campaign and the identity of the leaders,” making it 
“not unreasonable for the Board to conclude that under these 
circumstances Reichard’s question may have conveyed to 
Oberdick the message that the Company was contemplating 
retaliation against the union activists who were responsible 
for the organizing campaign.”  Id. at 538-39.  Jimenez could 
easily have assumed that Monica’s question regarding which 
unit employees were engaged in Union activities indicated 
that Woodcrest was contemplating taking some action against 
the pro-Union employees who were responsible for the 
organizing campaign.  Accordingly, substantial evidence 
supports the Board’s conclusion that this interrogation was 
unlawful.6 
                                              
6 Nothing in this opinion should be misinterpreted as 
indicating that asking employees meaningful questions, 
including probing for bias and testing credibility, during an 
internal investigation necessarily violates the NLRA.  Internal 
investigations, especially when conducted by outside counsel, 
serve an important function, and, in some circumstances, an 
employer’s legitimate business justification for an interview 
in connection with an internal investigation may be 
sufficiently substantial to overcome the coercive effect of an 
interview on employees’ union activities.  See, e.g., Textile 
Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 
268-69 (1965) (recognizing that a substantial business 
justification can outweigh the interference with employee’s 
rights and overcome § 8(a)(1) charges); Jeannette Corp. v. 
NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 918 (3d Cir. 1976) (same).  We need 
not engage the argument in this case, however, because no 
25 
 
The coerciveness of the remaining two interrogations 
is less clear, although, as stated above, Woodcrest loses if a 
single interrogation was coercive.  In particular, the 
conversation between Duggar and Lewis hardly seems 
coercive.  All we know about the Lewis-Duggar conversation 
is that “sometime after February 5, but before the 
representation election,” at some unstated place, Lewis asked 
Duggar “if she was in favor of the Union,” and Duggar 
replied truthfully that she was not.  (J.A. 383.)  Lewis “was 
not a top-level manager,” and “she and Duggar telephoned 
each other outside of work and are friends.”  (J.A. 382-83.)   
 
This conversation is analogous to a conversation that 
we found to be lawful in Graham Architectural—the 
interrogation of Darlene Stambaugh by Greg Nash.  There, a 
supervisor “called [Stambaugh] over to his desk and asked 
her whether she was for the Union.”  Graham Architectural, 
697 F.2d at 539.  They then had an extended discussion about 
“the advantages and disadvantages of the Union.”  Id.  Like 
here, “[t]he question itself contained no veiled threat or 
implication that the Company contemplated reprisals against 
union supporters.”  Id.  Here, the only evidence that the ALJ 
found of coercion was that Lewis reported Duggar’s response 
to management, yet there is no indication that Lewis gave 
Duggar any reason to suspect that she would do so.  Thus, 
that fact cannot be relevant to whether the “questioning must 
reasonably have tended to coerce under the circumstances.”  
Id. at 537-38.  The NLRB’s only case law to the contrary is 
from another interrogation in Graham Architectural in which 
we said that, considering all the other indicia of coercion, a 
                                                                                                     
such business justification was asserted by Woodcrest before 
the Board or on appeal. 
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supervisor’s friendly manner is insufficient to overturn the 
Board’s finding that substantial evidence supports a finding 
of coercion.  See id. at 538-39.  But here, there were no other 
indicia of coercion. 
 
The Vijayan-Dolcine conversation falls between these 
two extremes.  Unlike the Lewis-Duggar conversation, the 
Vijayan-Dolcine conversation involved a “high-level 
manager,” who approached a unit employee “at her 
workstation while she was on duty and asked to speak with 
her privately.”  (J.A. 375.)  Vijayan gave Dolcine an 
antiunion flyer and “ask[ed] about her union activities 
including why she needed a union.”  (J.A. 376.)  Given the 
formality of the conversation, the power dynamic, and the 
fact that Vijayan made it clear to Dolcine (by giving her the 
antiunion flyer) what Vijayan’s views were and what 
Dolcine’s answer should be, the Board may well have had 
substantial evidence to support its conclusion that the 
interrogation was coercive, although we need not find more 
than one interrogation coercive for the result here.   
Because at least one interrogation was coercive, we 
will affirm and enforce this part of the Order.7 
                                              
7 We note that the remedy imposed was imprecise.  The 
Board ordered Woodcrest to cease and desist from 
“[i]nterrogating its employees about their union membership, 
activities, and sympathies” (J.A. 20, 388), but the Notice to 
Employees, which the Board required Woodcrest to post, 
states that Woodcrest “WILL NOT coercively interrogate you 
regarding your union membership, activities, and sympathies” 
(J.A. 20, 390 (emphasis added)).  To the extent that the 
remedy could be misconstrued as prohibiting employee 
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C. Unlawful Impression of Surveillance 
Woodcrest was found to have violated § 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA by creating an unlawful impression of surveillance.  
“Conduct which gives the impression of surveillance violates 
section 8(a)(1) if the conduct reasonably tends to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their 
section 7 rights.”  Hanlon & Wilson Co. v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 
606, 613 (3d Cir. 1984).   
1. Background 
Here, the surveillance claim relates to two interactions 
between Jimenez and Assistant Director of Recreation 
Vladamir Guerrero that occurred after the election.  In the 
first interaction, Guerrero told Jimenez, “I heard your name; 
your name has been popping out a lot.”  (J.A. 18.)  In the 
second interaction, which occurred approximately a month 
later, Guerrero saw Jimenez in the lunch room and said, “Oh 
it’s the famous boy.”  (Id.)  Jimenez followed Guerrero into 
the latter’s office.  Guerrero said that the Director of Nursing 
had distributed a memorandum about a newspaper article 
containing pro-Union statements by Jimenez and had 
mentioned his name several times at a management meeting.  
Crucially, Guerrero then told Jimenez, “they’re pretty pissed” 
about the article, so “watch [your] back, be careful, careful 
about what you say, you know, do what you have to do, come 
to work early, and then just, you know, do your job and go 
home.”  (J.A. 380.)  He said Jimenez should “tone it down a 
                                                                                                     
interrogations that are not coercive, we clarify that the cease 
and desist order applies only to coercive interrogations. 
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little bit” and keep his pro-Union views “under wraps.”  (J.A. 
18.) 
 
The ALJ explained that the Board’s test for unlawful-
impression-of-surveillance claims is “whether an employee 
would reasonably assume from the statement(s) in question 
[that] his or her union activities have been placed under 
surveillance.”  (J.A. 381.)  The ALJ rejected the claim of 
unlawful impression of surveillance because Jimenez was a 
“very visible and vocal supporter of the Union” and 
Guerrero’s statements do not establish that Woodcrest “was 
observing or monitoring him or his activities more closely.”  
(Id.)   
 
On appeal, the Board reversed under a totality of the 
circumstances test.  The Board faulted the ALJ for “not 
address[ing]” Jimenez’s “uncontradicted testimony that 
Guerrero warned him to ‘watch [his] back, be careful, careful 
about what you say . . . do what you have to do, come to work 
early, and then just . . . do your job and go home,’ or 
Guerrero’s testimony that he advised Jimenez to ‘tone it down 
a little bit,’ and to keep his views about the Union ‘under 
wraps.’”  (J.A. 19 (alterations in original).)  These comments 
“would reasonably be understood by Jimenez as a warning 
that [Woodcrest] was moving from routine observation to 
closely monitoring the degree and extent of his union activity, 
open or not, and if he continued to engage in such activity, he 
could face reprisals.”  (Id.) 
 
The Board’s remedy for this violation was for 
Woodcrest to cease and desist from “creating the impression 
that employees’ union and other protected concerted activities 
were under surveillance.”  (J.A. 20.)  The Board also 
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amended the required notice to employees so that it reads: 
Woodcrest “WILL NOT create the impression that your 
union and other protected concerted activities are under 
surveillance.”  (Id.) 
2. Analysis 
Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from giving the 
“impression of surveillance” if doing so “reasonably tends to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
their section 7 rights.”  Hanlon & Wilson, 738 F.2d at 613.  
“There need not be actual interference or coercion to have a 
section 8(a)(1) violation.”  Id.  “‘The significant fact . . . is 
whether [the supervisor’s] statement had a reasonable 
tendency to discourage the employees in exercising their 
statutory rights by creating the impression that he had sources 
of information about their union activity.’”  Id. (alterations in 
original) (quoting Overnite Transp. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 132, 
133 (1981)).   
 
We have had several opportunities to consider 
unlawful impression of surveillance claims.  In Hanlon & 
Wilson, we found that substantial evidence supported the 
Board’s determination that the employer had created an 
unlawful impression of surveillance in violation of § 8(a)(1) 
where an employee was told that “[w]e hear you are trying to 
get the steel workers in here.”  Id.  In Frito-Lay, we found 
that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination 
that the employer had created an unlawful impression of 
surveillance by telling an employee that “he ‘understood’ 
from ‘an individual’ and that he had ‘heard . . . rumors’ that 
Hunter was starting a union.”  585 F.2d at 66 (alteration in 
original).  In Landis Tool Co., Division of Litton Industries v. 
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NLRB, we found that substantial evidence supported the 
Board’s determination that the employer had created an 
unlawful impression of surveillance because, inter alia, a 
foreman told two employees “that he knew they had signed 
union cards and that employee Miller was a union instigator.”  
460 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1972).   
 
Here, the Board emphasized Guerrero’s warning to 
Jimenez to “watch [your] back, be careful, careful about what 
you say . . . do what you have to do, come to work early, and 
then just . . . do your job and go home,” and to “tone it down 
a little bit” and to keep your views about the Union “under 
wraps.”8  (J.A. 19 (second and third alterations in original).)  
The Board also emphasized Guerrero’s comments to Jimenez 
that “I heard your name; your name has been popping out a 
lot” and that he is “the famous boy” whom management had 
named “several times at a management meeting.”  (J.A. 18.)  
Together, these comments suffice to establish that this part of 
the Order is supported by substantial evidence.  The 
Guerrero-Jimenez interaction is, if anything, more indicative 
of an unlawful impression of surveillance than were the 
conversations in Hanlon & Wilson, Frito-Lay, and Landis 
Tool.  In those three cases, a supervisor had told an employee 
that the company was aware of the employee’s union 
activities.  Here, not only did Guerrero indicate that 
Woodcrest was aware of Jimenez’s activities, but he actually 
told him to watch his back and keep his pro-Union views 
                                              
8 The fact that the Board disagreed with the ALJ on this issue 
does not make the Board’s conclusion any more suspect; it 
does not alter our standard of review.  See Hunter Douglas, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812-13 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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under wraps.  These statements had a reasonable tendency to 
discourage Jimenez in exercising his statutory rights by 
creating the impression that Woodcrest had sources of 
information about his union activity.  See Hanlon & Wilson, 
738 F.2d at 613. 
 
Woodcrest argues that Guerrero’s “tone it down a little 
bit” and “watch [your] back” comments did not convey an 
unlawful impression of surveillance, but rather conveyed an 
unlawful threat, which would not support an unlawful 
impression of surveillance charge.  However, it is an 
eminently reasonable inference that these comments 
conveyed an unlawful impression of surveillance.  “Watch 
your back” implies that someone else is watching.  Guerrero 
was not merely reporting information that Jimenez had 
voluntarily provided.  Guerrero affirmatively told Jimenez 
that he should watch his back and be “careful about what you 
say.”  (J.A. 19.)  Moreover, he urged him to avoid being 
where he could be observed engaging in pro-Union activity—
“just . . . do your job and go home.”  (J.A. 18 (alteration in 
original).)  These comments would cause a reasonable person 
to suspect that his actions are under surveillance and were 
specifically meant to encourage Jimenez to “tone . . . down” 
his activities in support of the Union.  (J.A. 19.)  This is the 
sort of coercion prohibited by § 8(a)(1), and the Board’s 
decision is therefore supported by substantial evidence.  
Accordingly, we will affirm and enforce this part of the 
Order. 
V. Conclusion 
We will affirm and enforce the Order with regard to 
the Board’s conclusions that Woodcrest violated § 8(a)(1) by 
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coercively interrogating at least one of its employees and by 
creating an unlawful impression of surveillance.  We will 
vacate the Order insofar as it concluded that Woodcrest’s 
withholding of benefits from unit employees violated 
§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(3), and will remand for further consideration 
in light of this opinion.   
